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I. INTRODUCTION
The steady movement of women with children into the workforce has
dramatically increased the demand for affordable, quality child care
services.' Yet, while demand for care climbs, working conditions in the
child care industry remain stagnant, and child care workers labor at the
very bottom of the economic ladder. As a group, they are poor women
who are disproportionately of color and who rarely receive job-related
benefits such as health insurance, sick leave, vacation time, or retirement
plans.2 Although this state of affairs would seem to suggest that the child
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1. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE 2004 GREEN
BOOK (Section 9 Child Care) 9-1 (2004) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK], available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/greenbook2003/Section9.pdf, RACHEL SCHU-
MACHER ET AL., UNTAPPED POTENTIAL? How STATES CONTRACT DIRECTLY WITH PROVIDERS
TO SHORE tP CHILD CARE CHOICES FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 18 (2003), available at
http://www.buildinitiative.org/docs/untappedrpt.pdf.
2. THE CENTER FOR THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, CURRENT DATA ON CHILD CARE
SALARIES AND BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2002) [hereinafter CURRENT DATA ON
CHILD CARE SALARIES], available at http://www.ccw.org/pubs/2002Compendium.pdf. See
also infra notes 33-43 and accompanying text (discussing the economic status and working
conditions of child care workers).
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care industry is ripe for organizing, less than five percent of all child care
workers in the United States belong to a union.3
Researchers have long recognized the difficulties of organizing low-
income service occupations like child care. The tenuous labor
arrangements of many low-income service workers, their employment at
decentralized worksites, and the pervasive instability in low-wage service
industries all frustrate efforts to mobilize workers and to bargain effectively
on their behalf.4  However, the recent success of unions, such as the
Service Employees International Union (SEIU), in organizing home care
workers, at a time when popular opinion regarded the work as
unorganizable, indicates that these obstacles are not insurmountable.5
Indeed, the organization of home care workers has been so successful that
it represents the largest gain for the United States labor movement in more
than six decades.6
SEIU's home care victory unfolded against a shifting economic
landscape. As economic restructuring has transformed the workplace,
replacing manufacturing jobs with service jobs,7 the labor movement has
increasingly recognized the limitations of traditional approaches to
organizing and representing workers.8 Conventional models of unionism,
3. LEA GRUNDY ET AL., LABOR'S ROLE IN ADDRESSING THE CHILD CARE CRISIS 12
(1999), available at http://www.laborproject.org/publications/pdf/wp1.pdf.
4. See Dorothy Sue Cobble, Union Strategies for Organizing and Representing the
New Service Workforce, 43 INDUS. REL. RES. ASS'N ANN. PROC. 76, 77-78 (1990)
[hereinafter Cobble, Union Strategies] (describing how the employment relationship has
changed over time and observing that despite such transformations, "the dominant model of
unionism remains the industrial model"); Dorothy Sue Cobble, Introduction: Remaking
Unions for the New Majority, in WOMEN AND UNIONS: FORGING A PARTNERSHIP 3 (Dorothy
Sue Cobble ed., 1993) [hereinafter Cobble, Remaking Unions] (claiming that unions based
on male, blue-collar factory workers are outdated, and arguing instead that a successful
labor movement must take the needs of female workers into account); James Green & Chris
Tilly, Service Unionism: Directions for Organizing, 1987 INDuS. REL. RES. ASS'N SPRING
PROC. 486, 487-88 [hereinafter Green & Tilly] (discussing reasons why the traditional
model of unionism does not work well for most service workers); Howard Wial, The
Emerging Organizational Structure of Unionism in Low-Wage Services, 45 RUTGERS L.
REV. 671 (1993) (discussing a model for structuring and organizing unions).
5. See infra notes 126-43 and accompanying text (discussing SEIU's home care
campaign).
6. Stu Schneider, Victories for Home Health Care Workers, 249 DOLLARS & SENSE 25,
26 (2003). See infra notes 126-43 and accompanying text (discussing SEIU's home care
campaign).
7. See Dorothy Sue Cobble, The Prospects for Unionism in a Service Society, in
WORKING IN THE SERVICE SOCIETY 333, 338 (Cameron L. Macdonald & Carmen Sirianni
eds., 1996) [hereinafter Cobble, Prospects] (stating that the vast majority of new job
creation is in the service sector); Elizabeth Engberg, Union Responses to the Contingent
Workforce, in WOMEN AND UNIONS: FORGING A PARTNERSHIP 162, 162 (Dorothy Sue
Cobble ed., 1993) (discussing changes in the United States economy).
8. See, e.g., Janice Fine, Community Unionism in Baltimore and Stamford: Beyond
the Politics of Particularism, 4 WORKING USA 59, 61 (2000) ("In this new era of high
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which were crafted with a manufacturing economy in mind, have proved
incapable of accommodating the realities of an increasingly service-
oriented workforce. 9 Confronted with this reality and a continual decline in
union membership,' ° segments of the labor movement have focused on
developing new organizing models that can reach the many unorganized
service sector workers." As Dorothy Sue Cobble suggests, labor is coming
to appreciate that low-wage service jobs are not unorganizable; instead,
"they require different models of organization and representation."' 2 This
Article examines how new models of unionism can usefully be applied to
the organization and representation of the child care workforce, and how
such models can both bolster the economic position of child care workers
as well as improve child care quality by linking quality with decent
working conditions.
Of course, achieving positive changes in the status of the child care
workforce is hindered by the inability of many parents to afford quality
child care. That inability commonly prompts commentators to demand
increased public support of child care. However, as I have argued
elsewhere, while a public commitment to child care is crucial to solving the
current child care crisis, such a commitment will not magically ensure
advantages for child care workers. 3 Far too frequently, enhanced funding
for child care has privileged child care consumers while ignoring the child
care workforce. The short-sightedness of this approach becomes apparent
when one considers that "[p]oor compensation and working conditions in
child care are the driving forces behind high turnover rates and mediocre
care."' 4
While unions are also not a magic elixir to solve the child care crisis,
they are well positioned to press for the type of government policies that
worker mobility, organizing needs something more than a work site as a base. In labor
markets that are overwhelmingly nonunion... firm-by-firm organizing is inadequate....
Just as they did in the early years of craft and industrial unionism, unions have concluded
that they have to focus more on geographic or industrial strategies in order to take wages out
of competition across a city, region, or industry.").
9. Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravich, It Takes More Than House Calls:
Organizing to Win with a Comprehensive Union-Building Strategy, in ORGANIZING To WIN:
NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 19 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998); Green &
Tilly, supra note 4, at 487.
10. See Union Members in 2004, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
Jan. 27, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_0127200
5.pdf (observing that in 2004, only 12.5% of wage and salary workers were union members,
and reporting that the "union membership rate has steadily declined from a high of 20.1% in
1983").
11. Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, supra note 9.
12. Cobble, Prospects, supra note 7, at 337.
13. Peggie R. Smith, Caring for Paid Caregivers: Linking Quality Child Care with
Improved Working Conditions, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 399 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Caring].
14. Id. at 409.
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can help ensure that child care workers do not continue to subsidize
America's poorly funded child care system by working for substandard
wages and few benefits. By marshaling the shared interests of children,
parents, and workers, the labor movement has initiated child care
campaigns across the country that recognize both the value of increased
public support for child care and the need to link improved quality with
decent job conditions. Although this inquiry focuses first and foremost on
the potential effectiveness of unionization for child care workers, a
secondary emphasis reveals the importance of state regulation to the labor
movement's ability to organize those workers who lack rights under
traditional collective bargaining statutes. As this Article demonstrates, an
effective organizing strategy for home-based child care workers, who are
usually treated as independent contractors, may require legislative
intervention.
This analysis is structured as follows: to establish the case for
unionization within the child care industry, Part II begins with a discussion
of the child care market, examining the supply and demand for child care,
the quality and costs of care, and the gendered nature of the work. This
Part also highlights the connection between quality care on behalf of
children and their parents, and improved working conditions on behalf of
child care workers. Part III explores the limitations of worksite unionism,
labor's traditional approach to collective bargaining, and Part IV examines
three alternative unionizing models that are particularly well suited to
represent the labor interests of low-income service workers: occupational
unionism, geographical/occupational unionism, and public care unionism.
Part V turns to a consideration of several unionizing campaigns to organize
child care workers, including campaigns directed at center-based workers
and home-based family child care providers.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHILD CARE INDUSTRY: DEMAND, SUPPLY,
COSTS, AND QUALITY
The growing demand of working parents seeking assistance in caring
for their children highlights demographic transformations in the workplace.
Consider that in 1947, the number of mothers in the labor force with
children between six and seventeen years of age was just over 25%."
Many families with children conformed to the societal expectation that
mothers would stay at home and care for their young children while fathers
would work outside of the home for paid wages. 16 Yet today, that norm has
15. GREEN BOOK, supra note 1, at 9-2.
16. See M. Rivka Polatnick, Working Parents, 80 NAT'L FORUM 38, 38 (2000) ("In
1940, only 10 percent of children under eighteen were living with an employed mother, but
by 1995, that figure had climbed to 68 percent.").
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largely gone by the wayside. In 2002, the labor force participation rate of
mothers with young children was 64%. 1' This shift has impacted married
women with young children as well as single mothers who rely more
heavily on child care arrangements. 8 Between 1996 and 2000, the labor
force participation rate of single mothers climbed from 65.9% to 75.5%. 19
That increase largely reflects the impact of welfare reform laws passed in
199620 that forced many poor mothers of young children into the workplace
in order to receive public support for child care.2 '
Turning from the demand side to the supply side, official statistics
indicate that there are 1.2 million paid child care workers in the United
States whose job responsibilities include nurturing the social and
educational development of children, supervising play, and helping them
with bathing, feeding, and other personal hygiene.22 While the majority of
these workers labor in center-based settings, both for profit and non-profit
centers, some 28% of child care workers are self-employed as family child
care providers who work out of their own homes2 3 Because this latter
group works within the private sphere and often goes undetected as a result,
the actual number of child care workers is believed to be much higher than
the official reports suggest.24 For example, according to the Center for the
Child Care Workforce, 2.3 million paid child care workers care for children
ages zero to five. 25 In addition to center-based workers and family child
17. GREEN BOOK, supra note 1, at 9-2 (reporting the labor force participation rate of
mothers with children under age six).
18. Id. at 9-5.
19. MARK LEVITAN & ROBIN GLUCK, MOTHERS' WORK: SINGLE MOTHERS'
EMPLOYMENT, EARNINGS, AND POVERTY IN THE AGE OF WELFARE REFORM 6, 15 (2001).
20. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), enacted in 1996, drastically reformed the welfare system. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-
619 (Supp. 2002). Under the existing law, an individual must satisfy stringent work
requirements in order to receive welfare. Id. § 607. For recent useful discussions of
PRWORA, see the Welfare Symposium at 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. (2004).
21. Bruce Fuller et al., Welfare Reform and Child Care Options for Low-Income
Families, 12 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 97 (2002); ROBERT J. LEMKE ET AL., CHILD CARE
AND THE WELFARE TO WORK TRANSITION 14-16 (Wellesley College Working Paper No.
2001-02, Mar. 13, 2001), available at www.wellesley.edu/Economics/wkpapers/wellwp_0
102.pdf, GREEN BOOK, supra note 1, at 9-5.
22. 39-9011 Child Care Workers, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, STANDARD OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION (2002-03
ed.), available at http://www.bls.gov/soc/soco9b 1.htm.
23. CTR. FOR THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE & HUMAN SERVS. POLICY CTR., ESTIMATING
THE SIZE AND COMPONENTS OF THE U.S. CHILD CARE WORKFORCE AND CAREGIVING
POPULATION 2 (May 2002) [hereinafter ESTIMATING CHILD CARE WORKFORCE], available at
http://www.ccw.org/pubs/workforceestimatereport.pdf.
24. Id; GREEN BOOK, supra note 1, at 9-17.
25. See ESTIMATING CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, supra note 23, at 2 (commenting that of
the 2.3 million caregivers, 24% work in center-based settings, "including private and public
child care centers, Head Start programs, and pre-kindergarten programs"; 28% are family
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care providers, the paid child care workforce includes au pairs and nannies,
who provide care in the child's home.26
Although the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics lists child care
as one of the "fastest growing occupations, 27 the industry is extremely
unstable. The child care job turnover rate far exceeds that of most other
occupations, with one-third of all workers departing the field each year in
search of better employment opportunities. 2' The industry's instability has
fueled concerns about the quality of care because a plethora of evidence
indicates that high job turnover rates lead to low quality care.29  Studies
show that child care centers marked by high job turnover have "classrooms
with less developmentally appropriate environments and activities," and
employ workers who "interact[] less sensitively and appropriately with
children."3 ° Children who attend centers with high turnover rates "lose the
continuity and consistency of care which is essential to healthy growth and
development.",31 By contrast, children cared for in stable child care settings
demonstrate greater cognitive skills, enhanced social skills, and a more
positive self-concept than their peers in centers with high turnover rates.32
child care providers; 35% "are paid relatives other than family child care providers"; and
13% are "paid non-relatives other than those working in centers or family child care
programs (e.g., nannies)").
26. ESTIMATING CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, supra note 23, at 2; AMY GILLMAN,
STRENGTHENING FAMILY CHILD CARE IN Low-INCOME COMMUNITIES (2001).
27. See ESTIMATING CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, supra note 23, at 6 (observing that the
"U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has named the category of 'child care workers' as among
the fastest-growing occupations for the decade 1998-2008 ... and has estimated that this
category will need to grow by 26% during that period").
28. See Elizabeth E. Manlove & Jacqueline R. Guzell, Intention to Leave, Anticipated
Reasons for Leaving, and 12-Month Turnover of Child Care Center Staff, 12 EARLY
CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 145, 145 (1997) (estimating that turnover rates among child care
workers ranges from 26% to 4 1%); CURRENT DATA ON CHILD CARE SALARIES, supra note 2,
at 3 (pointing out high turnover rates in the child care industry); GREEN BOOK, supra note 1,
at 9-20 (assessing the high turnover rates among workers in the field).
29. See, e.g., MARCY WHITEBOOK & DAN BELLM, TAKING ON TURNOVER: AN ACTION
GUIDE FOR CHILD CARE CENTER TEACHERS AND DIRECTORS (1999) (describing the impact of
high turnover on the quality of care); SUZANNE HELBURN ET AL., COST, QUALITY, AND CHILD
OUTCOMES IN CHILD CARE CENTERS, PUBLIC REPORT 71-73 (1995) (discussing the factors in
determining whether high quality care is administered); Carollee Howes & Claire E.
Hamilton, The Changing Experience of Child Care: Changes in Teachers and in Teacher-
Child Relationships and Children's Social Competence with Peers, 8 EARLY CHILDHOOD
RES. Q. 15 (1993) (discussing challenges impeding quality home care).
30. Marcy Whitebook & Laura Sakai, Turnover Begets Turnover: An Examination of
Job and Occupational Instability Among Child Care Center Staff, 18 EARLY CHILDHOOD
RES. Q. 273, 275 (2003).
31. Deanna M. Deery-Schmitt & Christine M. Todd, A Conceptual Model for Studying
Turnover Among Family Child Care Providers, 10 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 121, 122
(1995).
32. See JENNIFER PARK-JADOTTE ET AL., BUILDING A STRONGER CHILD CARE WORK-
FORCE: A REvIEw OF STUDIES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC COMPENSATION INITIATIVES
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The prevailing working conditions in child care readily explain the
industry's difficulty in retaining workers. Industry wages are extremely
low in absolute terms, as well as when compared with other occupations.33
In 2001, the median hourly wage for all child care workers was $7.71, and
on average, they earned an annual income of $16,430. 3' The situation is far
worse for family child care providers who, in 2001, earned only $4.00 an
hour.36 By comparison, cafeteria cooks earned $8.53 an hour, animal
caretakers earned $7.97 an hour, coatroom attendants earned $7.90 an hour,
and parking lot attendants earned $7.75 an hour.37
In addition, evidence indicates that accumulated human capital-by
way of experience, skill, and education-correlates weakly with wage
increases for child care workers. While many workers lack child-care
related training and education, workers who do possess these qualities are
not financially rewarded.3 s Moreover, child care workers experience lower
returns on productivity investments such as education relative to workers in
5, 8-9 (2002), available at http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/CCW.pdf (stating that higher retention
rates lead to enhanced care); DAVE RILEY, CHILD CARE QUALITY: DOES IT MATTER AND
DOES IT NEED TO BE IMPROVED? 2-3, (Jan. 16, 2002), available at http://www.uwex.edu/ce
s/flp/ece/pdfs/childcare.pdf (discussing the implications of a 40% turnover rate); HELBURN
ET AL., supra note 29, at 29-33 (stating the findings that cognitive and social ability of
children is related to the quality of the child-care experiences); Suzanne Helburn & Carollee
Howes, Child Care, Cost and Quality, 6 FUTURE OF CHILD. J. 62 (1996).
33. HEIDI HARTMANN & DIANA PIERCE, HIGH SKILL AND Low PAY: THE ECONOMICS OF
CHILD CARE WORK 47-48 (1989). See also ESTIMATING CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, supra
note 23, at 29 (describing women's lost wages as a result of working at home); MARCY
WHITEBOOK, WORKING FOR WORTHY WAGES: THE CHILD CARE COMPENSATION
MOVEMENT, 1970-2001 7 (2001, updated 2002), available at http://www.iir.berkeley.edu/cs
cce/pdf/worthywages.pdf (stating that salaries should be raised to competitive rates
comparable to those of elementary educators).
34. 2001 NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2001), available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/200l/oe
s39901 .htm.
35. Id.
36. JUST ECONOMICS, LIFTING THE LID ON CHILD CARE WORKERS' WAGES 4 (2001),
available at http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/trainings/childcarewages.pdf. On the economic
position of family child care providers, see generally MARY C. TUOMINEN, WE ARE NOT
BABYSITTERS: FAMILY CHILDCARE PROVIDERS REDEFINE WORK AND CARE, 7-12 (2003)
(describing reasons why women enter family child care work despite low wages).
37. 2001 NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2001), available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/2001/oes
39901 1.ht.
38. See David Blau, The Quality of Child Care: An Economic Perspective, in THE
ECONOMICS OF CHILD CARE 145, 167 (David Blau ed., 1991) (observing that child care
"[w]orkers with more education are not consistently paid higher wages than those with little
education"); HARTMANN & PIERCE, supra note 33, at 30 (commenting that "there is little
evidence that higher productivity providers actually are rewarded for their costly
investments in higher productivity").
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other occupational sectors.39  To illustrate, child care workers with a
college or graduate degree earn less than half the earnings received by
comparably educated women in other sectors.4"
The disadvantages of child care extend beyond the job's paltry wages.
Few child care workers receive benefits such as health care. To illustrate,
in Washington state, only 55% of child care centers offer health care to
workers, which is 15% less than the total of all workers in the state who
receive job-related health insurance.4' Moreover, even when child care
workers have access to an employer's health care plan, few can afford the
premiums.42 Along with limited health insurance, workers in the field
seldom receive other job-related benefits such as paid sick days, vacation
time, or retirement plans.43
The discouraging working conditions in child care are due in part to
the cost of quality care. While some families can afford to pay child care's
true cost, a defining characteristic of the industry is that most families
cannot, without support, finance the cost of high quality care, nor can they
afford to pay child care workers decent wages.4 4  As advocates have
39. See Manlove & Guzell, supra note 28, at 147 (observing that "[c]hild care workers
are consistently found to have earnings near the bottom of the wage scale in spite of having
higher than average levels of education"); David Blau, The Supply of Child Care Labor, 11
J. LAB. ECoN. 324, 339 (1993) [hereinafter Blau, Supply of Care Labor] (reporting that
"returns to education are lower for child care workers than for other sector workers").
40. Peter Pitegoff, Child Care Enterprise, Community Development, and Work, 81
GEO. L.J. 1897, 1923-24 (1993) (reporting that child care workers "earn substantially less
than comparably educated men or women in the work force," noting, for example, that
"child care workers with a college or graduate degree earned an annual average of $11,603,
compared with overall civilian labor force wages of $26,066 for women and $42,422 for
men with the same education"). See also TUOMrNEN, supra note 36, at 44 (suggesting
reasons why the wages of child care workers are so low relative to other workers); DAVID
BLAU, THE CHILD CARE PROBLEM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 31 (2001) (noting that "the
wages of child care workers are low compared to the wages of other women").
41. JEN BROWN, HEALTH INSURANCE FOR EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION WORKERS 1
(Economic Opportunity Institute Mar. 2002), http://www.econop.org/Health-lnsuranceForE
CEWorkers.pdf.
42. DAVID H. BRADLEY & STEPHEN A. HERZENBERG, PENNSYLVANIA CHILD CARE
WORKERS FACE HEALTH INSURANCE CRISIS 2 (2001), available at
http://www.keystoneresearch.org/publications/childcare.php. See also DAVID H. BRADLEY,
Low CHILD CARE WAGES AND HIGH TURNOVER SHORTCHANGE PENNSYLVANIA CHILDREN:
FINDINGS FROM SURVEYS OF CHILD CARE PROVIDERS IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY, SOUTHEAST
PENNSYLVANIA, AND YORK COUNTY 11 (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter BRADLEY, Low CHILD CARE
WAGES], http://www.keystoneresearch.org/publications/childcare.php (requires registration)
(discussing the high cost of premiums).
43. CURRENT DATA ON CHILD CARE SALARIES, supra note 2; MARCY WHITEBOOK ET
AL., WORTHY WORK, UNLIVABLE WAGES: THE NATIONAL CHILD CARE STAFFING STUDY,
1988-1997 20 (1998), available at http://www.ccw.org/pubs/worthywork.pdf.
44. DAN CLAWSON, THE NEXT UPSURGE: LABOR AND THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 69
(2003) ("Parents struggle to pay for child care even with the miserably low wages child care
workers now receive .... As long as funding comes from parent fees, there's no realistic
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repeatedly observed, improving the wages of workers and improving the
quality of care requires, at a minimum, a comprehensive policy of
government support and funding for child care.45
Poor compensation for child care workers also stems from societal
attitudes that regard the work as menial, unskilled labor that any woman
can readily perform. Examining the link between paid child care and
women's unpaid work in the home, scholars have shown that child care is
frequently dismissed as a form of emotional work that lacks economic
visibility and value. 46 Even though market-based child care is performed
for pay, there exists a strong tendency to devalue the work on the theory
that workers perform it "out of love." These perceptions have serious
economic consequences. As Paula England has documented, child care
workers suffer a wage penalty based on the job's perception as "women's
work.'" 7
III. THE CHALLENGES OF ORGANIZING CHILD CARE WORKERS
In light of the poor working conditions in child care and the growing
demand for such care, unionization should be considered as a vehicle to
help foster the economic viability of child care work. Yet, less than 5% of
the child care workforce is presently unionized. 48 Low union density, of
course, is not limited to the child care industry; currently about 8% of
way the centers used by working parents can pay higher wages."); BRADLEY, Low CHILD
CARE WAGES, supra note 42, at 15 ("Low compensation and high turnover in the
Pennsylvania child care industry reflect low wages and benefits which, in turn, stem from
working parents' inability to pay more."); HARTMANN & PIERCE, supra note 33.
45. See, e.g., ANNE L. ALSTOTr, No EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEI CHILDREN AND
WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 66-68 (2004) (discussing the public goods argument for
child care); SuZANNE W. HELBURN & BARBARA R. BERGMANN, AMERICA'S CHILD CARE
PROBLEM: THE WAY Our 3 (2002) (describing a number of different views on solving this
problem and concluding that an expansive federal child care program is an appropriate
course of action); BRADLEY, Low CHILD CARE WAGES, supra note 42, at 15 (commenting
that the state government of Pennsylvania must invest more in early care and education in
order to "lower turnover, maintain and improve the education levels of the child care
workforce, and raise the quality of child care for low-income workers"); NANCY FOLBRE,
THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES 83-108 (2001) (outlining
arguments for treating child care as a public good).
46. See, e.g., TUOMINEN, supra note 36, at 175 (discussing perceptions of family child
care work); Deborah Rutman, Child Care as Women's Work: Workers' Experiences of
Powerfulness and Powerlessness, 10 GENDER & SoC'Y 629, 630 (1996) (observing that the
emotional labor in child care "is neither recognized nor valued, likely because it tends to be
invisible"); HARTMANN & PIERCE, supra note 33.
47. Paula England et al., Wages of Virtue: The Relative Pay of Care Work, 49 Soc.
PROBS. 455 (2002).
48. See GRUNDY, supra note 3, at 12 (discussing the organization of child care
workers).
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private-sector workers belong to a union.49 While the labor movement
must find ways to reverse this trend on all industrial fronts, to do so in the
context of child care requires an appreciation of the peculiar difficulties of
using traditional models of collective bargaining to organize low-wage
service workers. Importantly, most jobs in the low-wage service sector
vary drastically from the manufacturing jobs that unions have historically
organized.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)50 is the basic federal
statute that governs the relationship among labor unions, employees, and
employers in the private sector.5 Enacted in 1935, the NLRA rests on a
theory of worksite unionism. 52 Worksite unionism reflects an organizing
model that depends heavily on a work environment with the following
attributes: the workplace is a fixed location that employees report to on a
regular basis; the employees to be organized work at a common worksite
for a single employer, such that both the employer and the bargaining unit
are easily identifiable; the dominant labor arrangement consists of full-time
employment; and employees have a relatively stable, long-term
employment relationship with their employer.53
Labor scholars have cogently demonstrated that this model of
unionism, which emerged in the 1930s and 1940s against the backdrop of
large industrial worksites, is ill equipped to address the workplace
49. See Union Members in 2005, News Release, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, Jan. 20, 2006, available at http://www.bIs.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.
pdf (detailing union membership trends in 2005).
50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
51. Section 7 of the NLRA, the Act's most crucial provision, states: "Employees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " 29
U.S.C. § 157 (2000).
52. See Wial, supra note 4, at 681-82 (noting that the model of worksite unionism
provides the template for NLRA caselaw); see also DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, DISHING IT OUT:
WAITRESSES AND THEIR UNIONS IN THE TWENTiETH CENTURY 9 (1991) [hereinafter COBBLE,
DISHING] (describing worksite unionism as "a form of unionism where rights and
protections were linked to a particular worksite").
53. See Francoise Carr6, Virginia duRivage & Chris Tilly, Representing the Part-time
and Contingent Workforce: Challenges for Unions and Public Policy, in RESTORING THE
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 314 (Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994) (discussing the
workplace conditions upon which much union organizing is predicated); Green & Tilly,
supra note 4 (showing similar trends); see also Kim Voss & Rachel Sherman, Breaking the
Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the American Labor Movement, 106 AM. J.
Soc. 303, 310 (2000) (observing that conventional union organizing consisted of
"organizing 'hot shops' ... focusing primarily on economic issues, especially wages and
benefits; conducting top-down campaigns from union headquarters, with minimal
participation by bargaining-unit members; reaching out to workers through gate leafleting,
letters, and similar kinds of nonpersonal contact; and dropping campaigns that did not
develop quickly enough").
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transformations that have occurred as the economic landscape has shifted
from manufacturing jobs to service-oriented jobs.54  The traditional
workplace of old, while not completely gone, has become seriously eroded.
Labor arrangements drastically differ in today's post-industrial world when
compared with the blue-collar jobs that once dominated the economy.55 As
Cobble writes, the new service majority is concentrated in "decentralized
workplaces with under fifty employees, and in jobs with less of a
permanent, continuous attachment to a single employer. 5 6 The workplace,
in effect, has become more "casual," populated by workers with non-
standard working arrangements, whose "relationship with individual
employers is brief, distant, and often mediated by a subcontractor or
temporary agency."57
In order to respond effectively to these transformations, the labor
movement must both allow for the growth of non-standard workplace
relationships, and it must recognize that the new rank and file is heavily
populated by women and people of color. Whereas worksite unionism
developed in response to the needs of white male workers,58 new models of
unionism must be capable of representing a burgeoning service economy
characterized by high levels of racial and gender segregation as well as
increasing numbers of immigrant workers.5 9
To meet the challenges of the changing workplace as they affect the
child care industry, unions must overcome several obstacles posed by the
54. Cobble, Prospects, supra note 7, at 341; Green & Tilly, supra note 4, at 487.
55. Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, supra note 9; Cobble, Remaking Unions, supra note 4,
at 4.
56. Cobble, Remaking Unions, supra note 4, at 4.
57. Id. at 14.
58. Cobble, Prospects, supra note 7, at 336. See also Marion Crain, Between Feminism
and Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex Equality, and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903,
1907 (1994) (commenting on "[u]nionism's historic association with the economic concerns
of white male workers... and the corresponding invisibility of women in union practice
and labor law doctrine"); Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered
Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1155, 1160-71 (1991) (discussing the labor
movement's historical exclusion of women); HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK AND THE LAW (1985) (examining the labor
movement's exclusion of African-Americans).
59. See ORGANIZING IMMIGRANTS: THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIONS IN CONTEMPORARY
CALIFORNIA (Ruth Milkman ed., 2000) (exploring the role of immigrant workers in the labor
movement, especially as it pertains to California); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The
Labyrinth of Solidarity: Why the Future of the American Labor Movement Depends on
Latino Workers, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1089 (1999) (discussing the role of Latinos in the
labor movement); Cobble, Remaking Unions, supra note 4, at 3 (detailing the relationship
between women and the labor movement); Green & Tilly, supra note 4, at 488 (discussing
particular characteristics of the service industry and observing that "women represent a
much larger proportion of the workforce" relative to goods-producing industries, and that
the service industry has a higher concentration of "minorities and undocumented workers").
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traditional reliance on worksite unionism. First, as discussed earlier,60 the
child care market is characterized by exceedingly high turnover rates; on
average, child care workers have a median job tenure of only 2.7 years.6'
Second, not only do child care workers lack enduring attachments with
particular employers, many tend to work for small, independent child care
agencies. High turnover rates and the prevalence of numerous small
agencies make it difficult to reach and unify the child care workforce in the
manner envisioned by worksite unionism, which presupposes long-term
attachments, workplace stability, and centralized employment sites.62 This
difficulty is further exacerbated by the proliferation of family child care
providers who are isolated from each other, and who lack a traditional
employment relationship because they are regarded as self-employed.63
Third, worksite unionism embraces an adversarial approach to
workplace relations that assumes "hostility and rigid demarcations between
labor and management." 64 Such an approach may prove counterproductive
in the child care industry, where management is often closely aligned with
labor. Even as child care directors and supervisors fare relatively better
than child care workers, they too earn low wages and experience high
turnover rates.65  Fourth, the conventional "us versus them" view of
workplace relations fails to capture the interpersonal dynamics that typify
60. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
61. Deery-Schmitt & Todd, supra note 31, at 122. See also Whitebook & Sakai, supra
note 30, at 274 (noting that turnover rate for child care jobs "is more than four times greater
than the 7% rate found among elementary school teachers"); Manlove & Guzell, supra note
28, at 145 (estimating turnover rates among child care workers at 26% to 41%); Pitegoff,
supra note 40, at 1924 (reporting that "seventy percent of child care workers interviewed
[for a study] in 1988 had left their jobs by 1992").
62. Green & Tilly, supra note 4, at 488 (observing that "[a] workforce where turnover
is rapid, as in small shops, does not fit the traditional organizing model based on a stable
workforce in a large plant"); DAN BELLM, NEW APPROACHES TO ORGANIZING IN THE CHILD
CARE INDUSTRY 6, available at http://www.laborproject.org/publications/pdf/bellm.pdf
(noting that "[t]he major obstacle to organizing childcare workers is that there are a large
number of employers, each with very few employees, making it extremely costly to
organize shop-by-shop").
63. Peggie Smith, Welfare, Child Care, and the People Who Care: Union
Representation of Family Child Care Providers (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author).
64. Cobble, Union Strategies, supra note 4, at 81.
65. See Whitebook & Sakai, supra note 30, at 283-89 (reporting on salary trends and
turnover rates in the child care industry); MARCY WHITEBOOK ET AL., THEN AND Now:
CHANGES IN CHILD CARE STAFFING 1994-2000 36 (2001), available at
www.ccw.org/pubs/Then&Nowfull.pdf (finding that directors received notably low wages
considering "their impressive experience and training"). In addition, as Cobble notes, in
many service jobs, compared with manufacturing jobs, "the line between employee and
employer is more indistinct" such that employment relations "may be personal and
collaborative rather than adversarial, formalized, and highly bureaucratic." Cobble,
Prospects, supra note 7, at 338.
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the provision of child care. Unlike most manufacturing jobs, but
comparable to many service jobs, child care involves personal interactions
with a customer or a client. Cobble insightfully comments that this "new
third party... complicates and transforms the old dyad. ''66 Due to the
personal dimension of service jobs, workers are often as concerned with
issues of "product" quality as they are with bread-and-butter issues such as
compensation levels and benefit packages.67 In the child care industry,
workers commonly form strong emotional and personal attachments with
the children in their care. 68 This type of personal involvement does not
comfortably fit with a model of unionism that embraces confrontation and
opposition.
Fifth, the success of worksite unionism depends heavily on its ability
to gain concessions from owners in order to make improvements in
working conditions.69 Owners in turn can commonly pass on the costs of a
bargaining agreement to their customers. 70 However, this approach stands
little, if any, chance of succeeding in the context of child care given that
many parents are unable to afford quality child care.71 Consequently,
absent increased public funding for child care, parents cannot be expected
to absorb the costs associated with enhanced wages or benefits for child
care workers.
66. Cobble, Remaking Unions, supra note 4, at 14.
67. Dorothy Sue Cobble, Making Postindustrial Unionism Possible, in RESTORING THE
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 285 (Sheldon Friedman et al., eds. 1994); Dorothy Sue
Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Work Force: Lessons from the History of Waitress
Unionism, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 419 (1991) [hereinafter Cobble, Organizing the
Postindustrial Work Force]; Green & Tilly, supra note 4, at 488, 490.
68. TUOMINEN, supra note 36; see generally JULIA WRIGLEY, OTHER PEOPLE'S
CHILDREN: AN INTIMATE ACCOUNT OF THE DILEMMAS FACING MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS AND
THE WOMEN THEY HIRE TO RAISE THEIR CHILDREN (1995) (describing the relationship
between child care workers and the children in their care).
69. See, e.g., DAVID M. WINCH, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: A
WELFARE ECONOMICS ASSESSMENT 66 (1989) (referencing the costs labor unions impose on
employers in order to get employers to establish better conditions for workers); ALBERT
REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 100-09 (1962) (discussing the costs unions confer
on employers in an attempt to improve standards of living for employees).
70. See, e.g., RAYMOND HOGLER, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 255 (2004) (noting that bargaining for higher wages leads to a
higher cost of production, which employers can pass on to consumers); E. EDWARD HERMAN
& ALFRED KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR RELATIONS 257 (1981) (observing
that "[i]ncreased contract costs are often passed on to consumers as higher prices"); NEIL W.
CHAMBERLAIN & JAMES W. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 391 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing
the steel industry in the 1970s, where "employers concessions to the union [were] passed
along to consumers through price increases").
71. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
increased public support for child care in light of parents' financial inability to afford quality
care).
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IV. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF UNIONISM
The attributes of child care work described above underscore the need
to fashion alternative organizing models that can accommodate the
proliferation of workplace arrangements that do not adhere to traditional
employment relationships. Labor scholars have studied a range of non-
traditional organizing approaches to investigate their potential to advance
the interests of workers with non-standard work arrangements. 7 Thus,
before examining the partnerships that unions are forging with the child
care workforce, it is instructive to first discuss labor's new union strategies
to advance the economic well-being of low-wage service workers. Three
models of unionism directed towards this group of workers hold particular
relevance: occupational unionism, geographical/occupa-tional unionism,
and public care unionism.
A. Occupational Unionism
The work of Dorothy Sue Cobble is central to any serious examination
of the challenge of advancing strategies that can secure representational
rights for low-wage service workers. Cobble has articulated a model of
"occupational unionism,"73 as an alternative to worksite unionism, that
draws on the labor history of waitresses and the experiences of the Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union (HERE) in
organizing waitresses during the first half of the twentieth century.74
Unlike worksite unionism, which pursues mobilization and unification of
workers based on a shared worksite, occupational unionism organizes
workers based on a common occupational identity and prioritizes
72. Scholars whose work offers particular insight into organizing low-income service
workers include Kate Bronfenbrenner, Dorothy Sue Cobble, Jennifer Gordon, Stephen
Herzenberg, and Howard Wial. See, e.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS
(2005) (analyzing the successes and failures of efforts to organize immigrants in low wage
jobs); STEPHEN HERZENBERG, ET AL., NEW RULES FOR A NEW ECONOMY: EMPLOYMENT AND
OPPORTUNITY IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA xi (1998) (evaluating "the dynamics of today's
service industries and jobs" in order to "map out a set of public policies that will benefit
workers as well as businesses and consumers"); ORGANIZING To WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON
UNION STRATEGIES (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) (comparing, contrasting, and
analyzing union organizing strategies); COBBLE, DISHING, supra note 52, at 9 (outlining "a
new typology of unionism"); Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Work Force, supra note
67, at 420 (examining the history of occupational unionism); Wial, supra note 4, at 672-73
(arguing that "a new kind of union organizational structure is needed in order to enable low-
wage service workers to organize and achieve effective representation").
73. Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Work Force, supra note 67, at 420.
74. See generally COBBLE, DISHING, supra note 52 (documenting the history of waitress
unionism).
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employment security over job security.75 This approach was especially
effective in organizing waitresses, who remained attached to waitressing as
an occupation even as they often changed employers within the restaurant
industry.76
Occupational unionism historically derived much of its strength from
the operation of union-operated hiring halls that allowed workers to gain
control over the supply of their labor.77 For workers, hiring halls offer
various benefits. The halls act as a placement service, providing workers
with access to job opportunities without charging the often high rates
associated with employment agencies.78  Hiring halls can also
accommodate the transient, highly mobile character of low-wage service
workers.79 By matching workers in need of jobs with employers in need of
workers, hiring halls greatly reduce the need for workers to engage in time-
consuming job searches. Finally, hiring halls provide a structure that
enables workers at different worksites to unite as a group and to
collectively press for job improvements that would be beyond the reach of
individual workers.80
. Occupational unionism is advantageous not only for workers but also
for employers. Unions, utilizing "peer management" techniques, maintain
occupational competency among workers and often upgrade workers' skills
through the use of programs emphasizing job training.81 In the context of
waitressing, the hiring halls sponsored apprenticeship programs for
relatively new waitresses that involved both classroom experience and on-
the-job training. 2 Employers found the hiring hall device appealing
because it gave them access to trained waitresses. In addition, the union
accepted responsibility for monitoring the performance of the workers by,
for example, screening workers to ensure that they had experience. 83 This
type of commitment to standards promoted the mutual interests of
84waitresses and restaurant owners.
Occupational unionism is relevant for child care workers on several
fronts. By moving away from single-worksite unionism, it sets the stage
75. COBBLE, DISHING, supra note 52, at 9, 137-40; Cobble, Organizing the
Postindustrial Workforce, supra note 67, at 420-21.
76. COBBLE, DISHING, supra note 52, at 49.
77. Id. at 138-39.
78. Id. at 138.
79. Cobble, Prospects, supra note 7, at 350.
80. Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Workforce, supra note 67, at 425.
81. Id. at 426-27; Cobble, Union Strategies, supra note 4, at 80-81.
82. COBBLE, DISHING, supra note 52, at 141.
83. Id. at 70, 92; Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Workforce, supra note 67, at
429-30.
84. COBBLE, DISHING, supra note 52, at 146-47; Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial
Workforce, supra note 67, at 429.
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for an organizing strategy that has the potential to bring together a diverse
group of child care workers who labor at different worksites. This
approach may match especially well with family child care providers who
are otherwise isolated from each other. Aspects of the hiring hall structure
that Cobble discusses persist today among low-wage service workers in the
form of worker-run cooperatives.85 Although cooperatives often lack the
muscle to drastically alter working conditions, 86 they do serve an important
first step in any organizing strategy-namely helping to identify and unify
workers. In addition, cooperatives can provide child care workers with a
shared collective space where they may be able to pool their resources to
gain access to benefits that may otherwise be unattainable.
A second advantage of occupational unionism for child care workers
stems from its emphasis on professional development. Cobble writes that
this focus was especially striking among unionized waitresses who
struggled to have their work regarded as "a real trade by which any girl
might be proud to earn her living., 87 Unionization provided a vehicle that
allowed them to "raise their moral and social status by establishing their
work as a distinct craft and themselves as skilled craftswomen."8' Child
care workers are fighting a comparable battle to have their work deemed
worthy of social and economic respect. Since child care is often
stigmatized as unskilled "women's" work,89 strategies to upgrade the job
can play an instrumental role in redefining the work as valuable, skilled
labor. Importantly, professionalization-by way of improved training and
education-will benefit not only child care workers but also children
receiving care. As suggested earlier,90 enhanced professionalization
correlates strongly with high quality care and improved outcomes for
children.
Despite these advantages, occupational unionism does pose some
85. See, e.g., Peggie Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household
Workers and Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. LAW REV. 45, 86-91 (2000)
[hereinafter Smith, Organizing] (discussing the cooperative structure in the context of paid
household workers); Scott L. Cummings, Developing Cooperatives as a Job Creation
Strategy for Low-Income Workers, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 181, 191-94 (1999)
(discussing the origins and formation of a domestic cooperative based in Los Angeles).
86. JOHN PENCAVEL, WORKER PARTICIPATION: LESSONS FROM THE WORKER CO-OPS OF
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 27 (2002) (highlighting some of the shirking problems that can
undermine the success of worker cooperatives); Smith, Organizing, supra note 85, at 91
(discussing the inability of cooperatives to gain sufficient control over labor markets in
order to achieve wage increases for workers).
87. COBBLE, DISHING, supra note 52, at 120.
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (commenting on the social and
economic devaluation of paid child care).
90. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (discussing the link between the
stability and quality of child care and the well-being of children in child care).
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limitations as applied to child care. First, and perhaps most importantly, a
modified hiring hall-in the form of a cooperative-may prove
counterproductive if used in the fashion envisioned by Cobble as a job-
placement mechanism. As Cobble writes, the hiring hall structure is
especially advantageous for "workers who desire mobility between
employers and a variety of work experience"91 as well as for workers
whose need for flexibility prompts frequent movement from employer to
employer.92 Likewise, for employers, hiring halls offer a ready supply of
temporary or short-term workers. 93 Yet, while the use of temporary or
intermittent employees presents few, if any, adverse consequences in
various fields, and indeed is desirable in some industries, 94 such cannot be
said of child care. In child care, labor stability is extremely important to
the quality of care. As discussed in Part II, much of the current concern
about child care's poor quality stems from high turnover rates among
workers and the adverse impact of such instability on both children and the
child care profession.95 Consequently, from a quality perspective, the
preferred staffing approach in child care is not to rely upon temporary
workers but instead to assemble a well-trained and stable workforce that
will best enable children to develop to their full potential and to feel secure
in their attachments with others.96
91. Cobble, Union Strategies, supra note 4, at 80.
92. Id. See also COBBLE, DISHING, supra note 52, at 139 (observing that waitresses
supported the hiring hall concept because it gave them, rather than the employer, "control
over when and how much they worked. As long as they maintained their union standing,
waitresses could quit a job and 'lay off for however long they chose; they could also work
on a regular part-time basis simply by relying on extra jobs coming into the hall."); Cobble,
Organizing the Postindustrial Workforce, supra note 67, at 433 (commenting that the
"worker-run employment agency.., has the potential to offer workers flexibility in
scheduling and overall worktime (since arrangements for qualified substitutes can be made
through the union)").
. 93. Cobble, Prospects, supra note 7, at 350-51 ("Hiring halls also facilitated organizing
because they offered the employer a valuable service: a steady source of trained reliable
labor.").
94. Id. at 350 (describing the benefits of having temporary workers available). See also
Cobble, Union Strategies, supra note 4, at 80 (citing the casual day-labor market as well as
the health care sector, particularly nursing, as examples of job settings that are readily
amenable to organization and representation through the use of a modified hiring hall).
95. See supra notes 27-29, 62 and accompanying text (discussing the high turnover rate
in child care and its adverse consequences).
96. A further limitation of the traditional hiring hall structure is that, historically, much
of the success of hiring halls turned on their use in conjunction with closed-shop
agreements. Such agreements required all workers to join a union in order to be hired and
further required that employers go through the union hiring hall in order to secure workers.
See COBBLE, DISHING, supra note 52, at 138; Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial
Workforce, supra note 67, at 423-24 (explaining that the success of the hiring halls resulted
from their control of the labor supply through closed shops and other restrictions); Wial,
supra note 4, at 686 (explaining that "[e]mployers are required to maintain closed shops and
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A second concern is that occupational unionism, by its very name,
presupposes a strong identity to a particular occupation.97 For example, as
part of its waitress-based organizing campaign, HERE capitalized on the
occupational consciousness of waitresses to secure portable workplace
rights that followed the workers as they moved from restaurant to
restaurant.9" This type of intra-occupational mobility and attachment does
not appear to exist in the child care industry. The discouraging labor
conditions in child care cause many workers to leave and locate
employment opportunities in alternative fields.99
B. Geographical/Occupational Unionism
Howard Wial uses the term "geographical/occupational" unionism to
refer to the organization of low-wage service workers who belong to "a
loosely defined occupational grouping within a localized geographical
area. ' °  This model of organizing aims to establish uniform working
to hire only through the union's hiring hall. Workers are prohibited from soliciting work
outside of the hiring hall"). Used together, the hiring hall and the closed-shop agreements
enabled unions to control the labor supply in a given geographical area. However, the
hiring hall has lost much of its power to influence labor markets in the aftermath of the Taft-
Hartley amendments to the NLRA, which prohibit closed-shop agreements. Section 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA prohibits an employer from agreeing to a closed shop, and section 8(b)(2)
forbids a union to attempt to force an employer to do so. See generally THE DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW 40-45 (Charles Morris ed., 2d ed. 1983) (discussing the Taft-Hartley changes
to the NLRA).
97. This strong occupational identity reflects occupational unionism's roots in craft
unionism. See COBBLE, DISHING, supra note 52, at 6 (observing that one of the practices
long associated with craft unionism is an "emphasis on craft identity and specialization");
Cobble, Prospects, supra note 7, at 345 (observing that "[fjor waitresses, craft or
occupational identity was one of the prime elements of their work culture and overall world
view").
98. Cobble, Prospects, supra note 7, at 348; Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial
Workforce, supra note 67, at 425.
99. While a focus on a shared occupational identity may not be beneficial as a
technique to unify child care workers, one can imagine the value of portable rights if the
workforce became stabilized. In the meantime, strategies should be pursued to create
portable benefits that extend across occupational lines such that workers would not lose
their health insurance, for example, if they switched from work in the food service industry
to child care. See, e.g., Eileen Silverstein, Bringing Forth a New World From the Ashes of
the Old, 34 CONN. L. REv. 803 (2002) (discussing the "psychological contract" and its effect
on temporary and permanent workers' view of job security); Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal
Regulation of the Changing [Employment] Contract, 13 CORNELL J. LAB. & PUB. POL. 563
(2004) (exploring the new relationship between employers and employees, which is
primarily characterized as temporary); Katherine Elizabeth Ulrich, You Can't Take It with
You: An Examination of Employee Benefit Portability and Its Relationship to Job Lock and
the New Psychological Contract, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 173 (2002) (analyzing the
mobile job force in relation to employment benefits and potential "job lock" effects).
100. Wial, supra note 4, at 693.
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conditions by using a master employment contract that would apply to
most, if not all, industry employers in a given region."°1
Geographical/occupational unionism's goal of organizing workers within
specific geographic areas is similar to occupational unionism, although-
unlike occupational unionism-it is not predicated on workers having a
strong occupational consciousness. 10 2  In addition, whereas occupational
unionism influences wages and benefits by gaining control over the labor
force through the use of a hiring hall, geographical/occupational unionism
accomplishes the same by pushing for industry-wide, uniform standards.'03
The SEIU's Justice for Janitors (JfJ) campaign nicely captures the
vision of geographical/occupational unionism.10 4 The campaign unfurled in
response to the specific attributes of the building services industry, which is
"disjointed, localized and very competitive.' 15 As John Howley explains,
the working arrangement between building owners and building service
workers, such as janitors, has shifted over time:
Originally, these workers were direct employees of the building's
owner or managing agent, and the union typically bargained with
city-wide associations of owners and managers. Today, this
arrangement persists in only a handful of cities where the union is
very strong. Increasingly, the trend is for building management
to contract-out building service work.1
0 6
The practice of contracting-out in the building services industry
thwarted conventional organizing models whereby unions pushed for
official recognition as the elected representative of a group of employees
within the NLRA electoral framework. Assuming a union won an election
with a building services contractor, the building owner could readily render
the election a hollow victory by terminating the unionized contractor and
hiring a non-unionized contractor. 07  Although the contractors were
101. See id. (explaining the structure of the geographical/occupational union).
102. Id. at 686 (observing that today's low wage service workers presently "lack the
strong occupational consciousness that characterizes" the type of craft unionism that
undergirds occupational unionism).
103. See id. at 693 (detailing how wage and benefit structure is established for an
occupation within a specific region); see also Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a
Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 557,
611 (1996) (discussing Wial's geographical unionism and its strengths and weaknesses for
low-wage workers).
104. See Wial, supra note 4, at 692 (citing Justice for Janitors as an example of the
geographical/occupational union model).
105. Richard Hurd & William Rouse, Progressive Union Organizing: The SEIU Justice
for Janitors Campaign, 21 REV. RADICAL POL. EcON. 70, 71 (1989).
106. John Howley, Justice for Janitors: The Challenge of Organizing in Contract
Services, 15 LAB. RES. REV. 61, 62 (Spring 1990).
107. See Roger Waldinger et al., Helots No More: A Case Study of the Justice for
Janitors Campaign in Los Angeles, in ORGANIZING TO WIN, supra note 9 (studying the
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officially the janitors' employers, the contractors lacked power. The real
power rested with the building owners who controlled wages and
determined benefits, but who were unreachable under the NLRA because
they were not regarded as the janitors' legal employers.' Consequently,
the SEIU eschewed National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) elections with
individual contractors and instead focused on organizing all contractors
within a given labor market.'0 9
Geographical/occupational unionism offers two noticeable benefits to
child care workers. First, this approach demonstrates that unions can
represent the interests of workers without going through the process of an
NLRB election to become the official legal representative of the workers." 0
As explained by a JfJ advocate, this type of anti-NLRB representational
approach entailed "acting union without a contract.""' Second, and
related, geographical/occupational unionism makes use of a multi-
employer, master contract that sets terms and conditions that apply to
employers across the industry." 2  Together, these two aspects of
geographical/occupational unionism may advance the representational
interests of the child care workforce, given the existence of many small
individual child care agencies and the potential costs involved in trying to
hold an NLRB election at each agency." 3 In lieu of pursuing such a costly
strategy, unions may gain mileage from adopting geographi-
cal/occupational unionism, first, to organize sufficient numbers of child
care workers across employers within a region so as to gain control of the
creation and history of fJ); Howley, supra note 106, at 65 (observing that the problem
facing the janitorial industry stems from the contractor structure).
108. See Howley, supra note 106, at 65 (explaining how the NLRA was circumvented by
the owners not actually being the janitors' employer); see also CLAWSON, supra note 44, at
99-100 (observing that "[t]echnically, janitors are employed by cleaning contractors, who
typically operate on short-term (thirty-day) contracts").
109. See Alexander Colvin, Rethinking Bargaining Unit Determination: Labor Law and
the Structure of Collective Representation in a Changing Workplace, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 419, 430 (1998) (pointing out the conflict that often occurs when different
bargaining units do not fall under the NLRA and citing the Jf0 campaign as an example of
the successful resolution of this conflict); Waldinger, supra note 107, at 114 (describing
JfJ's strategy to bargain with owners without utilizing traditional NLRB devices); Wial,
supra note 4, at 693-94 (including f3 as an example of geographical/occupational
unionism); Howley, supra note 106, at 65-67 (recounting how JfJ organized janitors to
exert pressure on building owners although technically employed by contractors).
110. See CLAWSON, supra note 44, at 91 (discussing the advantages of avoiding an
NLRB election and noting the tactic's association with the civil rights movement).
111. Waldinger, supra note 107, at 115.
112. See Waldinger, supra note 107 (reporting the bargaining power exerted by the
janitors through various strikes); Wial, supra note 4 (describing the mechanics of
geographical unionism).
113. BELLM, supra note 62, at 4 (recounting the success of the United Child Care Union
campaign).
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labor market, and afterwards, to implement a master contract.
A potential disadvantage of the type of geographical/occupational
unionism associated with JfJ is its strong reliance on highly confrontational
"guerilla" tactics. Marches, demonstrations, and strikes were par for the
course in the JfJ campaign, prompting one observer to describe it as a
"fight in the gutter."' 114  While such militancy is not inherent to
geographical/occupational unionism,"' the use of "disruptive direct
action ' 16 to challenge employer union opposition has frequently
characterized revitalized organizing approaches, particularly those that
eschew the NLRB's normal election procedures." 7 Given the paucity of
organized child care workers at this point, it is unclear whether, and to what
extent, they would be willing to engage in public and confrontational
tactics, which may threaten the welfare of the children in their care.
To be sure, in a few areas of the country, child care workers have gone
on strike. In New York City, unionized workers at more than 300 private
child care centers that primarily serve low-income families went on strike
in 2003 and again in 2004, disrupting the care of some 27,000 children. 18
That said, anecdotal evidence suggests that many child care workers may
be reluctant to participate in highly confrontational tactics. As one
commentator observed, "some child-care workers philosophically object to
unions because they fear that a strike ... would hurt the children they care
for and alienate their parents."' 1 9  Of course, it is worth noting that
114. Waldinger, supra note 107, at 115. See also Ruben J. Garcia, Across the Borders:
Immigrant Status and Identity in Law and Latcrit Theory, 55 FLA. L. REv. 511, 528 (2003)
(commenting on the militancy of the JfJ campaign).
115. Other new approaches to organizing have also employed militant tactics. See
Richard Hurd, Learning from Clerical Unions: Two Cases of Organizing Success, 14
LABOR STUDIES J. 30, 38-41 (1989) (discussing the use of militant tactics employed by the
SEIU in organizing clerical staff at Columbia University and Harvard University).
116. Voss & Sherman, supra note 53, at 316. In addition to strikes, disruptive direct
action includes "civil disobedience, large demonstrations, arrest actions, and regular
picketing." Id. at 318.
117. Writing in THE NEXT UPSURGE, Dan Clawson suggests that such militancy is often
par for the course when the NLRA proves ineffective, thus enabling employers to thwart
unionization. CLAWSON, supra note 44, at 98-99 (adding that unions have increasingly
chosen militancy when faced with employer defiance and the inability to achieve results by
relying on the conventional NLRB process).
118. See Leslie Kaufman, Strike Today to Complicate Day Care for Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2004, at B4 (detailing another child care strike in New York); Steven Greenhouse,
Day Care Workers Stage a Daylong Strike Over Raises, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at 6
(covering child care strike in New York); see also David Crary, Child Care Workers in 2
Cities Organize, Reduce Staff Turnover Rates, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 5, 2002, at A05
(reporting on the month-long strike of child care workers in Connecticut).
119. Katherine Yung, Child-Care Unions Build Forces, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 3,
2002, at 23A. See also JIM MORIN, TAKING MATTERS INTO OUR OWN HANDS: A GUIDE TO
UNIONIZING IN THE CHILD CARE FIELD 15 (1991) (noting that a challenge to organizing is
that "[cihild care teachers often do not perceive themselves as the type who join unions");
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unionized public school teachers, who also work closely with children,
have frequently used the power of the strike to advance their cause,
notwithstanding their concern over the potential fallout a strike may have
on students. 120  Yet, to date, most child care advocates seem careful to
avoid the "s" word in organizing campaigns, opting instead to push for
partnerships with owners of child care centers. This strategy likely reflects
both a desire to avoid inconveniencing parents and disrupting the care of
children as well as an appreciation that many center-based owners
themselves lack the funds to dramatically improve working conditions.
Thus, in the aforementioned New York City illustration, it is notable that
the decision to strike occurred only after the union failed to persuade
municipal legislators to increase child care funding to bolster the wages of
center-based workers. The strike was thus directed, not at the centers, but
at the city, and many of the parents, whose children attended the centers,
supported the efforts of striking workers to pressure the government for
increased funds. 
21
Andrea Fine, Child-Care Workers Begin to Nurture Fledgling Union, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 14, 1998, at 3 (reporting that a union organizer in Philadelphia commented
as follows about efforts to organize child care workers: "We go to visit people at their
centers, at homes, wherever is necessary .... When they hear the word 'union,' one of the
things that comes to mind is 'strikes,' but this is different. No one's going to walk out on
children."); BELLM, supra note 62, at 3 (commenting that "[w]ariness and anti-union
sentiments are common within this workforce, although there are signs of growing
openness. Typical concerns include: Will unions go against my concern for the children
and my relationships with families?"). Dan Clawson makes a similar observation in the
context of organizing campaigns directed at home care workers. See CLAWSON, supra note
44, at 127 (commenting that "[b]ecause home care workers provide vital individualized care
for people for whom they care deeply, a strike was not an option").
120. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Standards for Enjoining Teacher Strikes: The
Irreparable Harm Test and Its Statutory Analogues, 69 IOWA L. REv. 853, 853 (1984)
(observing that teacher strikes "[flrequently... entail a number of secondary consequences:
loss of day care for the school-age children of working parents, unavailability of free lunch
programs, jeopardy of the state financial assistance to local education programs, and college
admissions difficulties for high school seniors"). These and similar concerns have figured
prominently in court decisions regarding the legality of teacher strikes. See, e.g., Anchorage
Educ. Ass'n v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 648 P.2d 993, 996 (Alaska 1982) (observing that
"[wihile a teachers' strike would not directly affect the public's safety as would a police
officers' strike, nonetheless teachers can be considered indispensable to the daily
functioning of society during the scheduled academic year"); Bethel Park Sch. Dist. v.
Bethel Park Fed'n of Teachers, 420 A.2d 18, 19 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (observing that
lower court's order to end a teacher strike was supported given that the strike compromised
"state subsidies, instructional days, vocational jobs, higher education and special education
opportunities, counseling, social and health services, extracurricular enrichment programs,
and employees' work opportunities and wages").
121. Stephen Greenhouse, Labor Talks on Stage, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at B2
(observing that "[t]he day care centers are privately run, but the city provides almost all of
their financing, so the day care workers are directing their appeals to the mayor because he
indirectly pays their salaries"); Yael Kohen, Day Care Workers Rally for Higher Pay, N.Y.
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C. Public Care Unionism
The third type of unionism model of value to organizing child care
workers is a variant of public sector unionism, 122 which I refer to as public
care unionism. Unlike occupational unionism and geographical/occu-
pational unionism, both of which gained popularity in private-sector job
settings, public care unionism has emerged against the backdrop of
industries that rely heavily on public funding. As such, a defining
characteristic of this approach is labor's strong focus on political lobbying
for increased public funds to support improved working conditions.
Whereas private sector unions "seek to take wages out of competition by
creating alliances among similar workers, often across many employers in
the same labor market," public sector unions "typically ignore the labor
market, 1 2 1 focusing instead on "a single public organization.' 24 The term
public care unionism highlights the approach's evolution in the context of
care-related occupations that are consumer-directed, most notably home
care.125
As an organizing model, public care unionism is closely linked with
the SEIU, specifically its home care campaign. In 1999, the SERU
successfully organized and won the right to represent 74,000 home care
workers in Los Angeles county. 12 6  The success, which gained
unprecedented national attention, marked the largest union victory in the
SUN, June 10, 2004, at 1 (reporting how private day care centers are funded by the
government); Steven Greenhouse, Day Care Workers Stage a Daylong Strike Over Raises,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at 6 (observing that striking workers and their supporters carried
signs that read: "This is not against children. This is against Bloomberg"); Edward Barrera
& Frank Lombardi, Day Care Walkout Threat Strikes Fear in Parents, DAILY NEWS (NY),
Feb. 8, 2003, at 10 (noting the support of parents on behalf of striking workers).
122. See generally PAUL JOHNSTON, SUCCESS WHILE OTHERS FAIL: SOCIAL MOVEMENT
UNIONISM AND THE PUBLIC WORKPLACE (1994) (analyzing public sector unionism and
describing its significance as a social movement).
123. Id. at 9.
124. Id.
125. Consumer-directed care refers to a caregiving model in which consumers maintain a
level of decision-making authority about the nature of care and how it should be delivered
even when the care is publicly funded. Most consumer-directed care occurs in the context
of care for the elderly and disabled. See, e.g., Andrew I. Batavia, A Right to Personal
Assistance Services: "Most Integrated Setting Appropriate" Requirements and the
Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 17 (2000) (discussing
the role of consumer-directed personal assistance care for individuals with disabilities and
chronic conditions); Pamela Doty et al., Consumer-Directed Models of Personal Care:
Lessons from Medicaid, 74 MILBANK Q. 377 (1996) (evaluating approaches to administer
consumer-directed care arrangements funded by Medicaid).
126. See Linda Delp & Katie Quan, Homecare Worker Organizing in California: An
Analysis of a Successful Strategy, 27 LAB. STUDIES J. 1 (2002) (analyzing the success in
organizing California home care workers and describing it as the biggest union victory since
the 1940s in terms of numbers).
2006]
606 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 8:3
United States since 1937.127 The home care campaign is especially
instructive in exploring strategies to organize child care workers because of
the similarities between the two industries.
Home care workers assist the elderly and the disabled with a range of
caregiving activities such as preparing meals, helping with bathing,
dressing, and other personal hygiene tasks. 121 Similar to child care
workers, the individuals who perform these tasks are overwhelmingly
women and are disproportionately members of racial ethnic groups.
12 9
While demanding and difficult, the work enables the elderly and disabled
to remain in their homes instead of having to relocate to a nursing facility
or a residential care facility.13° However, despite the vital contribution of
home care workers, the work is frequently devalued and dismissed as
"women's work., 1 31 Most workers labor exceedingly long hours for little
pay and few benefits. In addition, workers often work on a part-time basis
and industry turnover is rampant. 
132
Against this landscape, prevailing wisdom held that home care work
was unorganizable. It seemed impossible to unify a group of workers who
labored in isolation from each other and within the private sphere of
individual clients' homes. To further complicate matters, home care
workers often provide services for more than one client. 133 Yet in the face
127. Schneider, supra note 6, at 26 (reporting on the success of the California
campaign); Delp & Quan, supra note 126, at 2 (examining the organizing tactics of the
California home care campaign).
128. See Smith, Organizing, supra note 85, at 74 (listing tasks performed by home care
workers).
129. See Delp & Quan, supra note 126, at 3 (providing statistics of home care workers);
Immanuel Ness, Organizing Health-Care Workers, 3 WORKING USA 59, 69 (1999)
(observing that the home care industry "predominantly consists of middle-aged minority
women" and that "[i]n New York City, documented immigrants and naturalized citizens
account for nearly 60 percent of all workers in the industry"); Ruth Needleman, Building
Relationships for the Long Haul: Unions and Community-Based Groups Working Together
To Organize Low-Wage Workers, in ORGANIZING To WIN, supra note 9, at 71, 78
(explaining that most home care workers are women and members of minority groups).
130. See CANDACE HowEs, UPGRADING CALIFORNIA'S HOME CARE WORKFORCE: THE
IMPACT OF POLITICAL ACTION AND UNIONIZATION (2004), available at http://www.iir.ucla.ed
u/scl/pdf/scl2004ch3.pdf (commenting that the elderly assisted by home care workers would
otherwise need to be in a facility); Schneider, supra note 6 (explaining how home care
workers' assistance allows the elderly to remain at home).
131. Ness, supra note 129, at 67-68.
132. See Steve Dawson & Rick Surpin, Direct Care Health Workers: You Get What You
Pay For, 25 GENERATIONS 23 (2001) (stressing the high turnover rates among home care
providers); Jane Aronson & Sheila Neysmith, You're Not Just in There to Do the Work:
Depersonalizing Policies and the Exploitation of Home Care Workers' Labor, 10 GENDER
& SOCIETY 59 (1996) (explaining how home care workers are not given respect, which in
turn impacts the level of care).
133. See Jessica Toledano, Health Workers for Home-Bound To Vote on Union, L.A.
Bus. J., Feb. 8, 1999, 1999 WLNR 5466674 (describing the efforts of home health care
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of naysayers, the SEIU mounted a labor intensive campaign to identify and
contact the thousands of home care workers who were scattered throughout
the County of Los Angeles. Whereas in manufacturing jobs, organizers
usually can contact workers by leafleting outside of factory gates, 34 SE1U
mobilized the home care workforce by engaging in a form of grassroots
activism that relied on media outlets, public rallies, the distribution of
leaflets and pamphlets in various languages, the canvassing of malls and
shopping centers, and contacts with community-based organizations such
as churches. 35 With time and patience, the workers came together.
Along with figuring out how to reach the workers, the SEIU
confronted the task of identifying an employer. In California, as in most
states, a combination of state and federal programs fund home care
services, and the workers are usually paid directly by the state. 36 Because
of this industry feature, the SEIU tried to convince the courts that the state
employed the home care workers. The courts disagreed, however, and held
that the workers were independent contractors.'37  This ruling was
potentially devastating, given that federal antitrust law treats unionizing on
the part of independent contractors as impermissible anti-competitive
behavior.
138
Thus it was critical for the union to create an employment relationship
on behalf of the workers. To do so, SEIU pursued a political campaign in
workers to unionize).
134. Green & Tilly, supra note 4, at 487. See also Ness, supra note 129, at 73
(discussing the grassroot strategies that labor used to organize home health care workers in
New York).
135. Schneider, supra note 6, at 25; Delp & Quan, supra note 126, at 6-8.
136. Smith, Caring, supra note 13, at 399; Schneider, supra note 6, at 25.
137. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 434 v. County of Los Angeles, 225 Cal. App.
3d 761 (1990). See also Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the Contingent Work
Force, 52 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 739, 742 (1995).
Initially, [the home care workers] assumed their employer was the State, which
gave them their paychecks each week. The State said, "not us, perhaps the
County." So the homecare workers looked to the County which assigned them
to clients and set their hours. The County said, "not us, perhaps the clients
themselves." Three years of litigation later, with no entity willing to admit to
being their employer, these minimum-wage Los Angeles homecare workers
were told by the court that they were all "independent contractors" having no
one to bargain with.
Id.
138. Wial, supra note 4. Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000),
"[e]very contract, combination.., or conspiracy" that unreasonably restrains competition is
illegal. Regarded as independent contractors, family child care providers do not fall under
the Clayton Act's exemption to antitrust liability. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000) (stating that the
"labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in
the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor...
organizations .... ).
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coalition with a range of interest groups (including senior citizen groups,
consumer advocacy groups, and disability activists) 139 that ultimately
resulted in the California State Legislature enacting legislation that required
each county in the state to establish a "public authority."'4 ° Under the law,
a public authority operates the home-care funding program in its county
(known as In-Home Supportive Services),14' and most importantly, serves
as the "employer of record" for home care workers for purposes of state
and federal collective bargaining laws. 142  Since the California campaign,
the SEIU has successfully pursued a comparable organizing approach in
Oregon and Washington and has won the right to represent almost 300,000
home care workers. 1
43
Public care unionism offers several instructive lessons for organizing
the child care workforce. First, it attests to the importance of forging
alliances across community groups to press for change where public funds
are at stake.' 44  As discussed earlier, improvements in the child care
industry hinge critically on increased public support for child care.
45
Second, public care unionism illuminates the value of linking quality care
with enhanced compensation for workers. SEIU's ability to build a strong
coalition for the home care campaign rested on demonstrating that poor
wages in the industry were undermining the level of care provided to
clients. 146  A similar linkage is appropriate for child care given the
139. See Delp & Quan, supra note 126, at 11-14 (discussing the value of coalition
building to the California home care campaign).
140. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12302.25 (West 2005). On the history of public
authorities in California, see generally CALIFORNIA STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, IN-
HOME SUPPORTIVE SERVICES: COUNTIES AT THE CROSSROADS (Nov. 2002), http://www.csac.
counties.org/legislation/IHSS.pdf.
141. See Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 434, 225 Cal. App. 3d at 765 (holding that
the county did not exercise sufficient control over the home health workers and therefore
could not be considered the employer even under dual or special employer theories).
142. HOWES, supra note 130, at 71; Schneider, supra note 6, at 25.
143. Schneider, supra note 6, at 27.
144. See Johnston, supra note 122, at 40 (highlighting the importance of alliances in the
public sector context).
145. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. See also Ness, supra note 129, at 64
(observing that "[b]ecause public workers are legally constrained in ways that private-sector
workers are not in the range of political behavior available to them, public-sector unions
must defend and augment their power through building political coalitions and movements
beneficial to their membership interest").
146. See Cobble, Prospects, supra note 7, at 349 (noting that "[h]ome health-care groups
reached out to the clients.., making the case that raising wages for aides would help clients
maintain quality service"). An emphasis on quality of service and professionalism also
figured prominently in SEIU's campaign to represent nurses at Boston City Hospital during
the 1980s. As Green and Tilly report, SEIU stressed that "professionalism, above all, means
a commitment to good patient care. Good patient care, in turn, depends on adequate
staffing, supplies, and other resources .... Green & Tilly, supra note 4, at 490; see also
Cobble, Prospects, supra note 7, at 344 (commenting that "[a] reconceived nurses
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considerable evidence documenting the positive correlation between decent
working conditions and quality child care. 147 Third, the type of grassroots
activism that enabled the SEIU to reach the many home care workers
should prove invaluable in mobilizing the child care workforce, particularly
those workers who are home-based family child care providers. Fourth, the
creation of an employer of record should assist union efforts to represent
family child care providers, since they too are usually regarded as
independent contractors. 1
48
Public care unionism's potential drawback as a strategy to organize
child care workers is that it usually strives to achieve formal union
recognition under applicable labor laws. Unfortunately, the time and effort
required to mobilize sufficient numbers of child care workers to vote in an
election may readily undermine the attainment of this result. Another
concern raised by public care unionism is that the model's success, as
measured by the extent to which the economic status of workers is
improved, rests on the ability to secure increased public funding. Yet in all
fairness, while public care unionism perhaps highlights this issue more so
than the other two models previously discussed, irrespective of which
model one uses to organize the child care workforce, the inadequacy of
public support for child care must be confronted.
All three unionism models embody elements that can prove beneficial
in securing representational rights for child care workers. The models'
most important shared attribute is that they depart from worksite
unionism's attachment to single worksite organizing. Their capacity to
mobilize workers within geographical regions and across different
worksites means that the interests of both center-based child care workers
and home-based family child care providers can be promoted.
Ultimately, the value of a given model depends on the type of child
care workers at issue, the workers themselves, and the surrounding labor
market. For example, while the confrontational tactics of
geographical/occupational unionism may fare well in a large urban
environment with many child care centers and with strong allies, such an
approach will likely hold little appeal in a smaller community where
confrontation may more readily threaten to harm social ties among
community members.
organization would concern itself with preserving the 'ethic of care' as well as the status of
the occupation").
147. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (discussing the connection between
working conditions and child care quality).
148. Independent contractors are usually exempted from the protection of most
employment laws. See infra notes 178, 192-96 and accompanying text (discussing the
treatment of family child care providers who are usually regarded as independent
contractors).
LABORING FOR CHILD CARE
U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
V. REPRESENTING CHILD CARE WORKERS
While still few and far between, efforts to organize the child care
workforce are emerging across the United States, often with the support of
national unions, including the SEIU and the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)1 49  To evaluate the
potential effectiveness of unions to promote the economic interests of child
care workers, this Part examines several child care organizing campaigns
that involve center-based child care workers as well as family child care
providers. Importantly, these campaigns have adapted elements from new
unionism models to craft organizing approaches that fit the general
attributes of the child care industry and the particular characteristics of a
given workforce.
A. The Role of Vouchers
At the outset, it is worth observing that the campaigns discussed
below reflect the reliance of low and moderate income parents on public
funding to help subsidize the cost of child care. An effective organizing
campaign must allow for this often complex child care funding scheme.
While a thorough discussion of that scheme falls outside the parameters of
this Article, it bears commenting that a substantial portion of child care
funding for parents who receive public subsidies occurs through
vouchers. 50  Vouchers are certificates given by the state or local
government to parents who qualify for subsidized child care.15" ' The
voucher enables a parent to purchase child care from a range of both
center-based and home-based child care providers. A provider that cares
for a child with a voucher is in turn reimbursed by the government at a rate
largely set by the government. 52 In light of this arrangement, child care
unions are attempting to secure enhanced public funds for child care as a
general matter, and more specifically, they are pressing states to raise the
149. MORIN, supra note 119, at 15; Smith, Caring, supra note 13, at 421-22. Other
national unions involved in organizing child care workers are the American Federation of
Teachers and the United Auto Workers. Crary, supra note 118, at A05.
150. See SCHUMACHER, supra note 1, at 1 (observing that "most states have moved to all-
or majority-voucher systems for delivering child care assistance to low-income working
families").
151. See SCHUMACHER, supra note 1, at 7 (defining child care vouchers); LEMKE, supra
note 21, at 6 (considering the impact of child care vouchers); Clare Huntington, Welfare
Reform and Child Care: A Proposal for State Legislation, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95,
114 (1996) (explaining state and local voucher systems and state discretion over subsidized
care).
152. SCHUMACHER, supra note 1, at 7; LEMKE, supra note 21, at 6; Huntington, supra
note 151, at 114.
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reimbursement rates paid to providers.'53
B. United Child Care Union (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)
154
The United Child Care Union (UCCU) is the first union in the country
dedicated solely to representing child care workers. A part of the National
Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees which is affiliated with
AFSCME, UCCU has its roots in a Philadelphia-based community
development cooperative known as Childspace' 55 A worker-owned
cooperative, Childspace provides affordable child care in low-income
neighborhoods. 56 Childspace reflects aspects of peer management similar
to those described by Cobble. As a cooperative, control of the organization
largely rests in the hands of the workers who, as worker-owners, are
responsible for establishing organizational policy on issues relating to
wages, working conditions, and training standards.'57
In 1998, Childspace helped to create UCCU. While worker ownership
was an important step toward empowering workers, achieving durable
improvements in the child care industry required a more comprehensive
strategy than that provided by the creation of an individual cooperative. 1
5 8
UCCU achieved its first major victory in 2000 when it successfully
organized workers at the Allegheny Child Care Academy, the largest for-
profit child care provider in Pennsylvania.'59 The following year, UCCU
153. See Karen MacPherson, Day Puts Focus on Plight of Child Care Workers,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Pennsylvania), May 13, 2001, at A-13 (observing that child
care "unions generally are trying to avoid increased fees for parents, who already foot 60
percent of the national child care bill. Instead, they are lobbying for more federal, state and
local government money for child care subsidies, teacher scholarships and health care
benefits for child care workers"); Elizabeth Mehren, Child-Care Workers Start to Take Care
of Themselves, L.A. TIMES, April 5, 2001, at El (highlighting political lobbying of child
care workers to increase state funding for child care).
154. Since its initial formation and child care campaign in Philadelphia, UCCU has
started efforts to organize child care workers in California and has expanded its focus to
include family child care providers. Luchina Fisher, Child Caretakers Push for Better
Wages, Benefits, IPS-INTER PRESS SERV., May 6, 2004.
155. Steve Callahan et al., Rowing the Boat with Two Oars, 5 NEIGHBORHOOD FUNDERS
GROUP REPORT (1998), available at www.nfg.org/reports/53pagel.htm. For an excellent
account of Childspace, see Pitegoff, supra note 40.
156. Pitegoff, supra note 40, at 1937-40.
157. Id. at 1937-38 (commenting that "the corporate culture and structure [of
Childspace] places the workers in a central role of responsibility and mutual respect. The
workers control the design and management of the centers' operations, including
responsibility for hiring and firing staff .....
158. Callahan, supra note 155.
159. AFSCME ORGANIZE, ORGANIZING VICTORIES, available at http://www.afscmeorgan
izers.org/win2000.htm. See Fisher, supra note 154 (describing the expansion of the
UCCU); see also David Whitford, Child Care: The McDonald's Model, FORTUNE, Sept. 18,
2000, at 333 (discussing Allegheny's pre-union approach to child care and noting its
2006]
612 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 8:3
signed a contract with Allegheny that included guaranteed work hours, a
reduced probationary period, an increase in paid leave, the provision of
paid service days for on-the-job-training, and a 17.5% guaranteed pay raise
over five years. 6 Notably, while Allegheny initially launched an
aggressive anti-union campaign against UCCU, 61 it has since formed a
strong partnership with the Union that highlights the type of mutual interest
approach associated with occupational unionism. As Cobble observes, for
many low-income service workers, economic empowerment requires
"more than animus against... [the] employer. 1 62  Instead of animus,
UCCU and Allegheny joined forces to help improve the profession through
sponsorship of programs that focus on worker training and mentoring1
63
For Allegheny, the union contract has been offset by workers who are
better trained and by a 20% reduction in turnover rates.'64
UCCU's approach to representing child care workers also reflects
aspects of geographical/occupational unionism and public care unionism.
As part of its goal to achieve industry-wide improvements on behalf of
both workers and children, the Union pursued a model of geographical
unionism that has thus far allowed it to organize and represent 22% of
Philadelphia's child care workforce.165 Because its membership primarily
serves the needs of low-income families, UCCU recognizes that parents
will be unable to absorb the cost of improved working conditions.1 66 Thus,
it has taken a page from public care unionism, and in collaboration with
parents and child care employers, it focuses much of its energy on pressing
the state legislature for increased child care funding. 1
67
prominence in Pennsylvania's child care industry).
160. Fisher, supra note 154.
161. BELLM, supra note 62, at 4.
162. Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Workforce, supra note 67, at 433. See also
Cobble, Prospects, supra note 7, at 340 (commenting that "[u]nion campaigns based merely
on an antiboss message may have little appeal").
163. BELLM, supra note 62, at 4.
164. See Yung, supra note 119, at 23A (noting that Allegheny, after reaching a contract
with UCCU, "has been trying to land more customers by stressing its unionized staffs
special training and stability" and quoting the owner of Allegheny who observed that "[t]he
entire industry would benefit from a union workforce... [t]he effectiveness of grievance
procedures for handling worker problems alone is a big advantage"). See also Fisher, supra
note 154 (noting that Allegheny was able to improve working conditions at its centers
"without raising fees for parents").
165. BELLM, supra note 62, at 4.
166. Fisher, supra note 154.
167. Fine, supra note 119; Fisher, supra note 154; MacPherson, supra note 153.
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C. SEIU District 925 (Seattle, Washington)
In Seattle, Washington, many of the city's center-based child care
workers belong to SEIU Local 925. The child care movement in
Washington has a long history that grew out of the Worthy Wages
Campaign, a grassroots movement that started in 1988 to heighten public
awareness of the poor conditions in child care work and the need for
affordable, quality care. 1
68
Comparable to Philadelphia's child care movement, Seattle organizers
understood that trying to organize each individual child care center in the
city would be a daunting task given the presence of many small
independent centers. Consequently, organizers adopted a model of
geographical/occupational unionism that had as its goal the negotiation of a
master contract with all of the child care centers in the city.169 Such a
strategy enabled the Union to promote region-wide labor standards with
respect to wages, the provision of pensions, and the availability of paid
time off.170 As of 2001, the Union had used this approach to organize
twelve centers that employed 150 child care workers.' 7'
In 1999, Washington state developed one of the more impressive
strategies to transform the child care industry in a fashion that would
benefit child care workers as well as children receiving care. That year, a
coalition of child care advocacy groups, spearheaded by SEIU, pursued a
public care unionism approach when it persuaded the governor of the state
to use public funds to establish an Early Childhood Education Career
Development Ladder in the state. The Ladder was a state-wide pilot
program that provided funding to child care centers if they agreed to adopt
a progressive wage ladder based on education, job tenure, and job
responsibilities. 7 2  The Ladder's key feature was that it predicated
168. Marcy Whitebook, Child Care Workers: High Demand, Low Wages, 563 ANNALS
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 146 (1999).
169. Fred Brooks, What Differences Unionizing Teachers Might Make on Child Care in
the USA: Results from an Exploratory Study, 32 CHILD & YOUTH CARE F. 3, 4 (2003); JOHN
BURBANK & NANCY WIEFEK, THE WASHINGTON STATE EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION
CAREER DEVELOPMENT LADDER (2001), available at http://www.econop.org/ECE-
PolicyBrief2001-SupplySideSolution.htm.
170. DEENA HEG & STEPHANIE SNYDER-CERDA, IMPROVING CHILD CARE WORKER
COMPENSATION IN WASHINGTON STATE: A CASE STUDY (Washington, DC: The Urban
Institute, 2002), available at http://www.urban.org/advocacyresearch/WAreport.pdf.
171. Labor Project for Working Families, Unions and Child Care Workers-Linking
Organizing and Advocacy, 9 LABOR NEWS FOR WORKING FAMILIES 3 (2001), available at
http://www. laborproject.org/newsletter/summer01 .html.
172. JENNIFER MOON & JOHN BURBANK, THE EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION CAREER
AND WAGE LADDER: A MODEL FOR IMPROVING QUALITY IN EARLY LEARNING AND CARE
PROGRAMS 2 (2004), available at http://www.econop.org/ELC/ChildCare/Ladder/Ladder070
4.pdf; PARK-JADOTTE, supra note 32; BURBANK & NANCY WIEFEK, supra note 169; Joan
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enhanced child care quality on the provision of a direct increase in the
regular wages of child care workers.'73 Under the Ladder, workers were
guaranteed a base wage and received pay increments of fifty cents an hour
for each qualifying educational credential they achieved (beginning with a
high school degree), "25 cents an hour for each year of service," and "50
cents an hour for increased job responsibilities.'
174
The positive impact of the Ladder was clear. In 2003, the average
hourly wage for workers employed by centers participating in the Ladder
was $9.68, compared with an average wage of $8.94 an hour for workers at
non-participating centers. 175  Anecdotal accounts also testified to the
Ladder's value. In the words of one child care worker employed at a
participating center:
This project has motivated not just me but most of the staff in our
center to continue their education or go to more training. This
has greatly improved the quality of care AND education that we
all give to the children in our classes. The morale throughout the
entire center has increased, and it seems that most of us are
willing to go over and beyond the "call of duty" for our director
and families. With the higher wages, we seem to all feel more
appreciated. 1
76
Yet despite evidence indicating that the Ladder was an effective tool to
help improve quality and working conditions in the child care industry, the
program ultimately fell victim to the state's budget woes and was
discontinued after the pilot period expired. Advocates are currently
pushing for legislation to reinstate the program on a permanent basis. 
17
D. Organizing Family Child Care Providers
Organizing family child care providers, who operate day care centers
within their own homes, presents its own unique obstacles. Such providers
are generally regarded as self-employed independent contractors, and they
Fitzgerald, Caring for Children as a Career, 13 AMER. PROSPECT 28 (2002).
173. MOON & BURBANK, supra note 172, at 6-7.
174. Id.
175. There were other significant differences in the provision of benefits between centers
participating in the Ladder (pilot sites) versus those that did not (comparison sites).
At pilot sites, 75 percent of employees received paid sick leave, 96 percent
received paid vacation, 91 percent received paid holidays, and 86 percent were
provided health insurance. In contrast, 60 percent of staff at comparison sites
received paid sick leave, 78 percent received paid vacation, 72 percent received
paid holidays, and only 45 percent were offered health insurance.
Id. at 9-10.
176. MOON & BURBANK, supra note 172, at 7.
177. Id. at 18-19.
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are largely hidden within the privacy of the family sphere. 171 In addition,
many family child care providers care for children on an informal basis as
part of an underground economy. 179 Thus, an effective organizing model
must be able not only to identify and congregate providers but also to
determine how to bargain on their behalf despite their perceived
independent contractor status. While at first glance organizing these
providers would seem to present a Herculean, if not impossible task,
organized labor has demonstrated a blossoming and impressive
commitment to mobilizing this segment of the workforce. While it is too
early to ascertain the long-term effects that labor's involvement might
produce, at this initial stage, two campaigns waged on behalf of family
child care providers offer instructive insight into how a revitalized labor
movement can position itself to push for the poorest of the poor. 1
80
1. An Employer of Record Approach (Illinois)
In Illinois, the SEIU recently achieved the largest union election in the
history of the state, and the largest child-care labor election in United States
history, when it won the right to represent more than 49,000 family child
care providers.181 The election, held in April 2005, followed a decade-long
organizing campaign by SEIU to mobilize Illinois providers, many of
whom are exempted from state licensing requirements. License exempt
providers in the state can care for up to three children and do not have to
comply with various state laws regulating the provision of in-home child
care such as home inspections.' 82 Most of the providers, who care for
children from low-income families that qualify for state child care
subsidies, receive as little as $9.48 a day for their work,8 3 and a recent
study by the Illinois Department of Human Resources reported that
approximately 58% of all family child care providers earn less than
178. Smith, Caring, supra note 13; TUOMINEN, supra note 36.
179. GILLMAN, supra note 26, at 1 (reporting on a study which found that "39 states have
family child care providers who are legally exempt from fire and safety rules, criminal
background checks and training requirements").
180. See TUOMINEN, supra note 36 and accompanying text (commenting on the
economic status of family child care providers).
181. Mike Comerford & Nushin Huq, Home Child-Care Workers Vote Overwhelmingly
to Unionize, CHI. DAILY HERALD, April 8, 2005, at 1; Barbara Rose, Union for Child-Care
Workers, CHI. TRIBUNE, April 8, 2005, at C1.
182. STEVEN G. ANDERSON ET AL., ILLINOIS STUDY OF LICENSE-EXEMPT CHILD CARE:
INTERIM REPORT 7-9 (May 2003), http://www.dhs.state.il.us/newsPublications/plansReports/
pdfs/dhsplan Reports isleccir.pdf, DAN LESSER ET AL., SUPPORTING ALL OUR CHILDREN:
CONFERENCE REPORT ON LICENSE-EXEMPT HOME CHILD CARE IN ILLINOIS (2002),
http://www.povertylaw.org/advocacy/documents/SupportingAllOurChildren.pdf.
183. Rose, supra note 181.
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$11,000 a year.
i
1
4
In considering the SEIU's victory, it is important to emphasize that the
Union had the political backing of Illinois' Democratic governor.
Although the providers are not regarded as state employees, the governor
had earlier signed an executive order that allowed them to organize and to
enter into collective bargaining agreements with the state. 185 The effect of
the order is comparable to that achieved in the California home care
campaign. The order effectively mandated that the state must act as a
"pseudo employer" for the providers for purposes of collective
bargaining. 8 6  While the political climate has thus far favored the
organization of Illinois home-based child care workers, the SEIU's ability
to deliver on its campaign promises to raise provider reimbursement rates
and secure key benefits, such as health care, remains uncertain as the state
grapples with budget constraints.
187
2. Family Child Care Providers as Employees, Not Independent
Contractors (Rhode Island)
In Rhode Island, family child care providers began coming together
over fifteen years ago in association with the Day Care Justice Committee,
a part of Direct Action for Rights and Equality (DARE), a non-profit
community action group based in Rhode Island that focuses on
empowering low-income minority communities. 8 Working with DARE,
the Committee received its first major victory when it successfully lobbied
the state to provide family child care providers with state health care
184. Comerford & Huq, supra note 181.
185. Ill. Exec. Order No. 2005-1 (Feb. 18, 2005).
The State shall recognize a representative designated by a majority of day care
home licensed and license exempt providers ... as the exclusive representative
of day care home providers... and engage in collective negotiations with said
representative concerning all terms and conditions of the provision of services
for day care home providers under the State's child care assistance program that
are within the State's control.
Id.
186. Two years earlier, in 2003, the governor had signed a similar executive order that
enabled the state's 20,000 home care workers to unionize and bargain with the state. See 20
ILL. COMP. STAT. 240513 (2004) ("The State shall engage in collective bargaining with an
exclusive representative of personal care attendants and personal assistants working under
the Home Services Program concerning their terms and conditions of employment that are
within the State's control.").
187. Rose, supra note 181.
188. PEGGY HAACK, FAMILY CHILD CARE: PEER-TO-PEER EXCHANGE 6 (1998), available
at http://www.ms.foundation.org/user-assets/PDF/Program/fccptopex.pdf; Changemaker:
Judy Victor, THE FUND FOR COMMUNITY PROGRESS (Spring 2003), available at
http://www.fundcp.org/newsletters/2003-2.
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coverage. 189  More recently, DARE-associated providers formed the
independent Day Care Justice Cooperative, which is affiliated with SEIU.
The Cooperative's present goal, backed by the Union, is to obtain
additional state funded job-related benefits. 90
Because the majority of Rhode Island's family child care providers
care for children who receive state subsidies, the state pays for the
providers' services even as the state regards the providers as independent
contractors. Yet the rate at which the state reimburses providers to care for
subsidized children is appallingly low and far too inadequate to allow the
providers to earn a living wage. Most of the providers, who are primarily
Latina and African-American women, earn an average wage of $2.76 an
hour. 191
To remedy this situation, SEIU is fighting for the legal right to
represent Rhode Island's family child care providers. The current hurdle
confronting SEIU is the same one that initially impeded the Union's efforts
to bargain on behalf of home care workers in California and on behalf of
family child care providers in Illinois; namely, the perception that the
workers are independent contractors. In Illinois, SEIU essentially
conceded this issue, and instead pressed successfully for legislation that
allowed the providers to unionize.
In Rhode Island, however, SEIU launched a legal challenge to the
state's insistence that the providers were independent contractors.
Surprisingly, the Rhode Island Labor Board agreed with the Union, and in
a four-to-three decision held that Rhode Island family child care providers
who contract with the state are not independent contractors, but instead are
state employees.192 The decision appears to be the first of its kind in the
country. While a court has previously held that home-based child care
providers were employees of a private company, 193 no reported legal
decision has previously regarded such providers as state employees. Under
most federal and state collective bargaining laws, the test of whether a
worker is an employee or independent contractor hinges largely, although
not solely, on the right of the alleged employer to exercise control over the
manner and the means by which the worker accomplishes her work. 9 4 The
189. THE FUND FOR COMMUNITY PROGRESS, supra note 188.
190. HAACK, supra note 188.
191. THE FUND FOR COMMUNITY PROGRESS, supra note 188.
192. In re State of R.I., Dep't of DCYF & DHS & New England Health Care Employees
Union, Local 1199, SEIU, AFL-CIO (Case No. EE-3671 Home Daycare Providers) 25, 28
(2004).
193. Rosemount Ctr., 248 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1323 (1980). But see Cardinal McCloskey's
Children's Family Serv., 298 N.L.R.B. 434 (1990) (concluding that family child care
providers were independent contractors of a non-profit organization).
194. In deciding whether individuals are employees or independent contractors for
purposes of both federal and state collective bargaining laws, courts often apply the
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more control the alleged employer exercises, the more likely it is that the
worker is an employee.
195
Importantly, the Rhode Island decision may represent a burgeoning
awareness of how state regulations governing child care can alter the nature
of family child care work. No longer can one readily presume that family
child care providers are independent contractors. Once archetypical small
business owners, some family child care providers are losing control over
how they conduct their business as a result of proliferating government
regulations. As the Rhode Island Labor Board wrote, because of Rhode
Island's pervasive regulations regarding the delivery of family child care,
the state controls virtually every aspect of providers' jobs. The state
controls who becomes a provider; providers' home and work environments;
the number of children they may care for; what they may feed the children;
daily routines with the children; methods of discipline; relationships with
assistants, if any; and providers' relationships with parents. 1
96
Although the decision has the potential to impact some 3000 family
child care providers in Rhode Island, the victory may prove to be short
lived as the state, worried about the financial implications of adding
common law agency test, which considers several factors:
[1] the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished[;] [2] the skill required; [3] the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; [4] the location of the work; [5] the duration of the
relationship between the parties; [6] whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; [7] the extent of the hired party's
discretion over when and how long to work; [8] the method of payment; [9] the
hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; [10] whether the work is part
of the regular business of the hiring party; [11] whether the hiring party is in
business; [12] the provision of employee benefits; and [13] the tax treatment of
the hired party.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750-52 (1989).
195. See, e.g., C.C.E., Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (observing that
"[w]hether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee is a function of the amount
of control that the company has over the way in which the worker performs his job"). For
critiques of the control test, see Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an
Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 295, 361 (2001) (observing that the control test often leads to uncertainty); Mark Linder,
Towards Universal Worker Coverage under the National Labor Relations Act: Making
Room for Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent Contractors, and Employee-like Persons, 66
U. DET. L. REv. 555 (1989) (using the case of leased taxi drivers to evaluate how companies
can readily manipulate the control test to deprive workers of collective bargaining rights);
Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 75, 85 (1984) (criticizing the use of the control test and arguing that it often
denies labor law protection to those workers who lack bargaining power vis-A-vis their
contractual relationship with businesses).
196. In re State of R.I., Dep't of DCYF & DHS & New England Health Care Employees
Union, Local 1199, SEIU, AFL-CIO (Case No. EE-3671 Home Daycare Providers) 25, 28
(2004).
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thousands of additional workers to its payroll, has appealed the Board's
decision.'97 Assuming the decision stands, the Union will likely proceed
with an election under the procedures of Rhode Island's public sector
collective bargaining law.'98 If such an election is successful, which all
indicators suggest that it would be, the state would be compelled to bargain
with a legal representative of the providers. In the event, however, that the
decision is overturned, the Union may nevertheless gain the right to
represent the providers by following in the footsteps of Illinois and
California. Legislation has been introduced in the Rhode Island legislature
that would essentially create a government entity, comparable to the public
authorities that administer home care programs, to serve as an employer of
record for the providers.199
Illinois and Rhode Island offer two very different blueprints to secure
representational rights on behalf of family child care providers. The
Illinois approach, which largely resembles organizational campaigns
directed at home care workers, bypasses the question of whether family
child care providers are independent contractors or employees. Instead, it
focuses on mounting a political campaign to pressure the state to define the
providers as employees for the limited purposes of collective bargaining
laws. By contrast, the approach in Rhode Island is completely novel. It
confronts head-on the perception that family child care providers are
independent contractors. In the end, however, both approaches aim to give
providers a voice in shaping the conditions under which they care for
subsidized children.
E. The Relative Advantage of Organizing Family Child Care Providers
In theory, it seems easier to represent the interests of center-based
workers, as opposed to family child care providers; yet, the foregoing
discussion suggests that the exact opposite may be true. To be sure, the
197. Liz Anderson, The Move to Unionize Daycare, PROVIDENCE J. (Rhode Island), April
15, 2004, at A-01.
198. R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-9.4-10 (2004).
199. Liz Anderson, Child-care Providers Closer to Unionizing, PROVIDENCE J. (Rhode
Island), Mar. 4, 2005, at A-01. The bill is known as the Family Child Care Providers
Business Opportunity Act. Id. The bill is similar in structure to the Illinois legislation
granting organizing rights to home health care workers in that it does not expressly mandate
the creation of a public entity to serve as an employer of record. Instead, the proposed
legislation provides that the relevant state agencies that currently coordinate the
participation of FCCPs in the state's Child Care Assistance Program shall negotiate with a
representative of the providers. H.B. 6099, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005); S.B.
855, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2005). Importantly, the bill would exempt family
child care providers from "federal antitrust laws that would otherwise prevent them, as
market competitors, from banding together in pursuit of a common goal." Anderson, Child-
Care Providers Closer to Unionizing, at A-01.
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process of unifying center-based workers is relatively easy compared to
family-based workers, because the former can be identified and contacted
more readily. However, one must remember that mobilization is only a
first step.
Achieving actual results on behalf of center-based workers may prove
more challenging, especially for those workers employed by centers in the
private sector. Importantly, these workers have a highly attenuated
relationship with the government-the most critical source of child care
funding. By contrast, many low-income family child care providers-those
who most need the benefits of unionization-provide subsidized care and
as a result, payment comes directly from the government. While
advocating for wage and other job improvements on behalf of both center-
based workers and family child care providers ultimately hinges on the
availability of increased state funds, it may be easier to pass on potential
increases to family child care providers because their connection with the
state is not brokered by an intermediary in the form of a center-employer.
In addition, unions may be more inclined to organize family child care
providers than center-based workers because, while bargaining for the
former can occur with one government agency acting as an employer of
record, bargaining on behalf of the latter will require unions to enter into a
contract with each individual center-based owner. With the typical center
employing twelve or fewer workers,2 °° unions will have to exert
considerable energy and finances to secure the right to represent center-
based workers and then to negotiate contracts on their behalf. While the
use of a master contract can reduce some of the costs associated with
bargaining with many individual centers, unions must still convince
individual employers to agree to the terms of a master contract.
Consequently, it is no surprise that the labor movement's greatest child
care victory thus far has occurred with respect to family child care
providers.
VI. CONCLUSION
All too frequently the debate over how best to resolve America's child
care problem fails to appreciate that the problem is as much a labor issue
for child care workers as it is an issue of affordability, availability, and
quality for child care consumers. The two issues are different sides of the
same poorly funded coin. Given the lack of industry regulation and the
appalling working conditions, we should not be surprised by reports
decrying the mediocre quality that characterizes large segments of the child
care industry. As I have observed elsewhere, long-term improvements in
200. ESTIMATING CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, supra note 23.
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the delivery of child care services depend on the existence of a "stabilized
child care labor market-characterized by improved wages, decent working
conditions, and low turnover rates. 2 °1
This Article has examined how a revitalized labor movement can help
achieve this result on behalf of child care workers as well as children and
their parents. While historically, the labor movement has ignored child
care as an occupation and child care workers as a group, there is reason for
optimism, as evidenced by labor's growing focus on low-wage service
workers in general, and child care workers in particular. Although it is too
early to tell whether unions will be able to secure greater economic security
for child care workers over the long term, the campaigns undertaken thus
far reveal several key ingredients of an effective organizing approach.
First, in order to improve the wages of child care workers, unions must
affirmatively push for enhanced public support of child care. Second, such
a push needs to emphasize the critical connection between quality care and
decent working conditions. Third, unions need to unite a broad base
coalition around the issue of child care that will clearly convey that child
care is a matter of public concern. To this end, unions should look to forge
partnerships with interested constituencies including parents, child care
employers, and community groups.
Notably, union involvement in representing child care workers has not
been limited to center-based workers but has extended to workers who
provide care from within their own homes as family child care providers.
The importance of this observation cannot be overstated, for it suggests the
extent to which unions are beginning to shed assumptions that certain jobs
are a priori unorganizable. Critical to the labor movement's ability to
represent the interests of child care workers has been a willingness to
abandon its traditional reliance on a model of worksite unionism and to
develop alternative organizing approaches that can respond to the needs of
an increasingly service-oriented workforce. While the approaches
examined-occupational unionism, geographical/occupational unionism,
and public care unionism-bring different strengths and weaknesses to the
table, and no one approach matches perfectly with the realities and needs of
all child care workers, the three approaches together offer a useful blueprint
for restructuring child care as a decent job that will attract and retain
workers who are committed to providing high quality care.
201. Smith, Caring, supra note 13, at 431.
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